Annex 1-A – the aspects of the ceasefire – is probably the most successful of all the previous annexes, but it is only partially implemented. Although peace has been maintained for almost four years, foreign forces are still present throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina. These include mujahideen, Croatian and Serbian groups. NATO pays the rent of many of its institutions to local political agents and does not fulfil its implementation potential under Article VI. What is most worrying is that war criminals are still at large, especially in Republika Srpska. In order to ensure sustainable regional stability, the DPA demanded specific security measures from the Republic of Croatia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. These include „new forms of transparency and the highest values, in line with the respective security of the contracting parties and the need to avoid an arms race in the region.“ [19] Stability should be achieved through various confidence and security measures and sub-regional arms control measures, which would ultimately reach the level of a regional arms control agreement. Unlike Schedule 1-A and the rest of the DPA, compliance with Schedule 1 B was voluntary and the parties were able to withdraw at any time after December 1999. To take advantage of the change in momentum, President Clinton sent National Security Adviser Anthony Lake and Secretary of State Peter Tarnoff to Europe to present a framework for peace. The United States has also made a key policy change to conduct airstrikes against the Serbs if they continue to threaten Bosnian safe areas or refuse to negotiate an agreement. In some cases, police services openly or covertly support illegal activities or oppose agreements signed by their own ethnic authorities. The Croats of Herzegovina seem particularly obstructionist and often openly support secessionist objectives.

Nowhere is this clearer than in Stolac. Pardew said the priority was to stop the killings, but the problem is the political structure created by Dayton. „Have we made mistakes? Of course we did. There are no perfect negotiations,“ Pardew said. But I would say that the greatest was to give the units, the Republika Srpska and the Federation, as much authority over the functioning of Bosnia as they had. I do not think we could have reached an agreement without the two entities, but I think we could have better limited the power to disrupt the state by those entities. The United States has played a key role in bringing peace, but Bosnia`s long-term goal has always been European integration. Over the past two decades, Bosnian politicians have tried unsuccessfully to amend the Constitution, implement important reforms and meet the conditions for membership of the European Union. The EU itself has also slowed down the accession process. Despite all this, Matthew Palmer, Assistant Under-Secretary of State for Europe and Eurasia, responsible for the Western Balkans, said that the European dream for Bosnia had no alternative.